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Abstract Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive
of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding
realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the
perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed.
In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether
the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements,
which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern
will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises,
which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I
focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I
conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function
as intended.
Keywords Immanuel Kant . Christine Korsgaard .Michael Smith . Constitutivism .
Constructivism . Transcendental argument . Anaytic/synthetic . Metaphysics
Philosophia
DOI 10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3
The first draft of this paper was presented to the 2014 Annual Conference of the European Consortium for
Political Research in Glasgow, as part of a panel on constitutivism. Work on the preparation of that draft was
carried out while I was visiting at the University of Vienna as part of the ERC Advanced Research Project
BDistortions of Normativity .^ I am grateful to the project’s PI, to the University of Vienna and to Keele
University for making that research visit possible. I am also grateful to the participants to the panel on
constitutivism for great discussions and to the two referees, who reviewed this paper, for some very useful
critical comments.
* Sorin Baiasu
s.baiasu@keele.ac.uk
1 Philosophy Programme, School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment,
Keele University, Keele ST5 5BG, UK
1 Introduction
Constitutivism seems to be one of the more promising versions of constructivism.1 It
aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this
way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism
in normative disciplines, such as ethics. Standards of action are not already given,
independently from us, but they are justified as constitutive of practical reason; yet,
they are not the result of arbitrary decisions, but are conditions, which make possible
agency. Nevertheless, the nature of the justification, which constitutivism can offer in
support of the normative standards it puts forward, is usually discussed from the
perspective of the debate between realism and anti-realism, the debate between the
view that there are normative standards independently from agents and the view that
normative standards are created by the (arbitrary) decisions of agents.2
In this paper, I would like to focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will
not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have
some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us;
instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be
derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative
conclusions themselves. Whether the premises or conclusions are constructed or
independent from construction is, in this context, almost irrelevant; what is relevant
is the extent to which an argument can enrich normatively its premises, so that we
would start from some premises, which are normatively weaker, and end up with
conclusions, which are normatively stronger.
1 Thus, Bthe importance of constructivism […] resides in the insight that the nature of practical truths should
be explained in terms of the constitutive features of practical reasoning^. (Bagnoli 2016) Of course, there are
various accounts of what constructivism and constitutivism are. This means, however, that on some accounts,
certain versions of constitutivism would be incompatible with certain versions of constructivism. For instance,
on some accounts, Kant’s version of constitutivism is quite different from Rawls’s version of constructivism.
(Krasnoff 1999)
2 Commentators acknowledge the significance of constitutivism irrespective of its contribution to the realism/
anti-realism debates, yet the focus continues to be on these debates. (Bagnoli 2016: esp. 7.3) The fundamental
objection is that if the construction is not normatively constrained, then norms are arbitrary; if it is normatively
constrained, then it relies on some normative constraints which are not constructed (for instance, Shafer-
Landau 2003: esp. Ch. 2). Some debates focus on ethical intuitions, as such constraints, and the extent to
which they can be taken as normative foundations. (Scanlon 1998: esp. Ch. 5; 2003) Some constructivists do
not see a role for ethical intuitions in the construction of norms. (O’Neill 1989; Hare 1983) One way such
constructivists respond to the fundamental objection is by claiming that constructed norms are constitutive
features of practical reason. (Korsgaard 1996). Korsgaard’s use of the language of transcendental arguments
suggests to some that her position is realist. (Crisp 2006: esp. Ch. 2, Sect. 2; Larmore 2008: esp. Ch. 5, Sect. 5;
Galvin 2011) The claim that to value ourselves presupposes as a necessary condition valuing humanity is
criticised as presupposing that a condition of a thing’s value is itself valuable. (Kerstein 2001; Ridge 2005;
Coleman 2006). Whereas constitutivism may distinguish itself from non-naturalist realism (Shafer-Landau
2003) and naturalist realism (Firth 1952; Railton 1986) by regarding norms as the result of a process of
construction undertaken from the first-person perspective (O’Neill 1989, Korsgaard 2003, 2009; Street 2010;
Velleman 2009), a worry remains that it relies on moral assumptions it does not justify eventually (Raz 2003:
esp.; Timmons 2003) One reply here is that the objection misses the point of constitutivism, where the method
is circular, but not in a vicious manner. (O’Neill 1992) A further objection is that constitutivism is unsuccessful
in deriving norms of morality from features of rational agency;. (Cohen 1996; Bratman 1998; Gibbard 1999;
Fitzpatrick 2005; Setiya 2007; Bagnoli 2009). Some such objections are formulated from a realist perspective,
whereas others are formulated from an anti-realist standpoint. For the full discussion, see Bagnoli (2016: esp.
7.3).
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Assuming that such a feat turns out to be possible, we could deal much more easily
with sceptical arguments.3 It is sufficient to start from premises sufficiently weak to be
accepted by the sceptic and to derive in a justified way normatively stronger conclusions,
in order to be able then to reject the sceptical position about the stronger, more substantial
normative claims. I have said that my concern is with an issue, which is distinct from the
debate between realism, anti-realism and constructivism, but related to this debate. This
relation is easily noticeable in a particular case. Thus, if we start with merely descriptive
premises and succeed in deriving normative claims through a constitutivist argument, then
those normative claims constructed through the justification provided by the argument
could no longer be suspected of secretly relying on some realist ground, on some
normative component smuggled in, in the premises of the argument. In other words, a
successful constitutivist argument could help constructivists show that it is possible to
justify substantial normative claims in a non-arbitrary manner and without realist pre-
mises. Yet, as already mentioned, this is not my concern here.
Now, one of the prominent constitutivist positions in the literature is Christine
Korsgaard’s and, in this paper, I will focus on its articulation in her The Sources of
Normativity. (1996) 4 The articulation of the constitutivist position in this text is
particularly important, since it suggests the kind of argument one would need, in order
to move from normatively weaker premises to normatively substantial conclusions.
Nevertheless, while a promising approach to this issue is suggested by Korsgaard, this
suggestion is not explored further in her texts.5 In this paper, I plan to examine this
approach more closely and to suggest how it can work successfully.
In the next section, I will consider one recent objection to Korsgaard’s constitutivism,
an objection according to which, far from beginning from slender premises, she would
start from a normatively substantial account of our essential identity and would then
attempt to derive from it robust normative claims. I argue that this objection relies on an
inaccurate interpretation of her position and, after a clarification, in Section 3, of some
elements of the conceptual framework of the discussion, I present (in Section 4) what I
take to be an accurate interpretation. Section 5 reconstructs the crucial argument of
Korsgaard’s constitutivism and Section 6 evaluates it. I conclude that more work would
need to be done, in order for Korsgaard’s argument to function as intended. One reason
why this additional work might not seem a welcome complement to her position is due to
3 A clarificatory note is in order: I see the constructivist-constitutivist problem of deriving a substantial
account of normative reasons from an account of the nature of action and agency as a particular case of the
more general problem of deriving substantial conclusions from more abstract and formal premises. Neverthe-
less, there is a sense in which this second problem does not really make sense. The reason is the following. As
we will see in Section 5 of this paper, I present such an argument as a valid syllogism. Yet, a valid logical
argument can never derive more substantial conclusions from slender premises. Premises are entailed by the
conclusions. The problems makes sense if we regard them in the following way. Consider an argument with
the premises A and A- > B; if B is already part of A, then the conclusion B does not add anything to A; by
contrast, if B is not already included in A, then the argument shows something substantial. To be sure, the
conclusion is already included in the premises, but the point is that in the formulation of the second premise (A
- > B), we derive from B something which was not already in A, as opposed to simply making A more explicit.
4 Since the paper focuses mainly on this text by Korsgaard, in what follows, references to this text will be
made by indicating the page(s) referred to only.
5 My claim here is that, whereas Korsgaard talks explicitly about a transcendental argument in Sources, she
abandons the expression in subsequent texts, perhaps also as a result of inviting in this way the criticism that
she is getting close to moral realism. See also n2 above. Nevertheless, according to some authors, she
continues to use transcendental arguments, even when she is not using this label for them – see n33 below.
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an important implication: in order for Korsgaard’s constitutivism to work, she would also
need to adopt a metaphysical position she might not be keen to embrace. But let us begin
with the objection to Korsgaard.
2 One Objection to Korsgaard’s Constitutivism
According to Michael Smith,
Constitutivism is the view that we can derive a substantive account of normative
reasons for action – perhaps a Kantian account, perhaps a hedonistic account,
perhaps a desire-fulfilment account, this is up for grabs – from abstract premises
about the nature of action and agency. (2015: 187)
Following this definition, therefore, constitutivism claims that we can get to a
substantial account of normative reasons for action from an account of the nature of
action and agency. Going from a view of action in general to a view of reasons for or
against the performance of particular actions seems to involve the creation of something
ex nihilo. As Eric Wiland notes, in relation to constitutivist arguments, B[t]hose who
claim to extract reasons out of agency remind us of those who claim to pull rabbits out
of hats^. (Wiland 2012: 141)6
Smith thinks he is able to perform this trick, and he also claims to be able to distinguish
his view from that of Banother constitutivist^, namely, Christine Korsgaard’s (again, with
reference to her 1996 text). According to him, Korsgaard commits Ba grave mistake^
when she identifies reasons Bas the demands to which we are subject in virtue of our
necessary identity .^ (2015: 193). Instead, we should regard reasons for action as connect-
ed with our function as agents. If we, with Korsgaard (as interpreted by Smith), think that
reasons for action are those demands to which we are subject insofar as we are the kind of
thing that we are essentially (that is, insofar as we share in the respective necessary
identity), we will end up with deliberative dilemmas. (2015: 194) For instance, to use
Smith’s example, wemay think of ourselves as essentially biological human beings facing
the demands of reproduction. At the same time, however, we may also see ourselves as
agents who have good reasons to help, and not interfere with, each other. The demands of
reproduction, on the one hand, and, on the other, those of helpfulness and non-interference
may be in tension or even irreconcilable conflict, in some circumstances.
Consider a particular person; as a human being, she will be a biological being
necessarily, since, by definition, this identity is essential for human beings. Since the
demand of reproduction is part of this identity, the particular person under consideration,
as a human being, is, as a matter of fact, subject to this demand. Yet, according to Smith,
this demand may come in contradiction with other demands, for which we may see
ourselves as having good reasons. Hence, the starting point for a constitutivist account
should not be some essential identity, but an account of ourselves as agents, since it is
within the framework of such an account of agency that we can talk about commitments
6 Quoted in Smith (2015: 187). Smith addresses here Wiland’s and David Enoch’s objections to constitutivism
(Enoch 2006), the former’s being formulated against Smith’s version of constitutivism, whereas the latter
being broader in focus.
Philosophia
and our reasons for these commitments. Hence, according to Smith, the conflicting
demands, which seem to be irreducible from the perspective of the presupposition of an
essential identity, disappear when the starting point is an account of ourselves as agents
and our reasons for commitment. For him, Bonly the demand relative to our function as
agents is analytically tied to the concept of a reason for action^. (2015: 19)
This suggests that there are at least two significant aspects of constitutivism, which
must be considered. First, with which account of ourselves the constitutivist begins seems
crucially important – on Smith’s account, Korsgaard starts with an account of our essential
identity, that is, an account of that without which we would be a different kind of being;
yet, being essentially this or that kind of being, with this or that kind of demands upon us
(say, biological human beings facing the demands of reproduction) leaves open the
question whether being in this way is normatively permissible and desirable.
Secondly, how this account is connected with the normative claims the constitutivist
derives seems equally significant, and here Smith specifies that the connection happens
Banalytically .^ As we will see, Korsgaard does not discuss this second important aspect
of a constitutivist account and, at least if we interpret an ‘analytic’ connection in the
standard way, Smith’s specification of the link between the account of ourselves as
agents and the normative conclusions identified as constitutive of action cannot pull
any normative rabbit out of the constitutivist hat.
My paper focuses on this aspect of constitutivism, precisely because it is a significant,
and yet not much examined, issue.Moreover, as alreadymentioned, I focus onKorsgaard’s
constitutivism, because, although she does not explicitly discuss the status of the connec-
tion between the initial account of agency, from which the constitutivist starts, and the later
substantial normative account, with which he hopes to conclude, she does make a
promising suggestion, which is worth pursuing. Nevertheless, to begin with, let us focus
on the first important aspect of constitutivism and examine Smith’s objection to Korsgaard.
If this starting point is flawed in Korsgaard, then there is not much interest in exploring
further the way in which a substantial normative account could be derived on this basis. I,
however, think that Korsgaard’s view on this is not flawed in the way Smith claims.
As mentioned above, on Smith’s account, the problemwith Korsgaard’s constitutivism
is that it is supposed to begin with an account of agency as given by our essential identity,
by the kind of thing we essentially are. The problem is that demands stemming from this
essential identity will be in tension or strong conflict with demands provided by reasons
we have, as agents, to act in one particular way or another. Yet, as we will see in more
detail in Section 4, Korsgaard’s starting point is not an account of our essential identity,
which would include some demands to which we would be subject as a matter of fact;
Korsgaard agrees that our various identities and roles may provide various demands on us
as a matter of fact, but she also regards us as beings that have the capacity to reflect on
these demands, to distance ourselves from them and to question them. She thinks that, as
self-reflective beings, we are beings that need reasons to act.
This characterisation of human beings as self-reflective beings that need reasons to act
asserts the connection between agency and reasons. Hence, if there is some essential
identity, which we must necessarily adopt and which forms the starting point for
Korsgaard, then this is only an identity as beings who need reasons, since we can question
any putative essential identity and try to determine whether to commit to its demand or
not. Hence, Korsgaard begins from an account of human beings, which makes it possible
for us to question our identities and roles and to justify our commitments to them.
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In conclusion, Korsgaard’s view, although admittedly dominated by an understand-
ing of reasons in terms of identity, does not link reasons to some essential identity,
which would make us subject to particular demands as a matter of fact. As human
beings, as self-reflective beings who need reasons to act, we have an identity, but this
identity does not impose specific demands – it questions them by reflecting on our
commitments, by evaluating them and by endorsing them, if we have reasons to
endorse them. According to Korsgaard:
Circumstances may cause you to call the practical importance of an identity into
question: falling in love with a Montague may make you think that being a Capulet
does not matter after all. […] What is not contingent is that you must be governed
by some conception of your practical identity. For unless you are committed to some
of your practical identity, youwill lose your grip on yourself as having any reason to
do one thing rather than another – and with it, your grip on yourself as having any
reason to live and act at all. But this reason for conforming to your particular
practical identities is not a reason that springs from one of those particular practical
identities. It is a reason that springs from your humanity itself, from your identity
simply as a human being, a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live.
And so it is a reason you have only if you treat your humanity as a practical,
normative, form of identity, that is, if you value yourself as a human being. But to
value yourself as a human being is to have moral identity. (1996: 120–1)
There is here a clear distinction between a person’s particular practical identities (such
as, being in love with a Montague) and a person’s identity as a human being (a reflective
animal who needs reasons to act and to live). This distinction already suggests that
Korsgaard begins with an account of ourselves as agents, as human beings who need
reasons for our commitments, but this is not an account, which would regard us as subject
to certain demands and reasons for action. On the contrary, as mentioned before, this
account makes possible the process of questioning any specific identities and commit-
ments. Moreover, our identity as human beings can itself become the object of reflection
and commitment. It is only when we acknowledge that our identity as human beings (as a
reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live, and, hence, as an agent) is valuable
that we acquire a moral identity. This moral identity, however, only makes sense from the
perspective of reflection and, hence, from the perspective of our humanity.
Hence, our humanity is a capacity, which is not always acknowledged as valuable;
we may continue our lives without acknowledging the value of reflection. When we
treat this human identity as an identity we should be committed to, we acquire moral
identity. But this moral identity is not an essential identity either, since not valuing your
human identity is still compatible with your capacity for reflection and agency, and it is
compatible with your being an agent, a human being. This, I think, answers Smith’s
objection to Korsgaard or at least makes this objection less urgent. Thus, to sum up, our
identity as human beings, makes it possible for us to question any putatively essential
identity, whereas our moral identity is acquired when we do not simply acknowledge
our reflective capacity and the need for reasons, but when we value them.
To be sure, there are here several questions, which are left open, such as: In what sense
does Korsgaard claim that we Bneed^ reasons to act and to live, given that she also
acknowledges that we may not value our reflective capacity and agency? Is it really the
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case that our moral identity is not an essential identity – after all, if we needed our
humanity, then should we not value it and, if so, then would moral identity not be a
necessary part of our identity as agents? We will see that such questions will emerge in
one form or another in the reconstruction and evaluation of Korsgaard’s argument for
normativity in Sections 4 and 5; in the next section, however, I turn to the second
important aspect of constitutivism mentioned above: the connection between, on the
one hand, the account of agency, which is the starting point for a constitutivist, and, on the
other, the normative claims she thinks she is able to derive from that account of agency.
3 The Constitutivist Trick
Smith claims that the concept of an agent’s reason for action Bis not basic^, but Bgets
analysed^ in terms of the concept of desirability-relative-to-that-agent. The latter, in its
turn, is not basic, but gets analysed in terms of the desires of that agent’s idealised
counterpart. Constitutivism enters the picture, Smith argues, when we ask ourselves
whether the concept of ideality (the desires of the agent’s idealised counterpart) is basic.
He thinks the notion of the agent’s idealised counterpart should in fact be that of an
agent’s functioning optimally as a desire-realiser. (Smith 2015: 189) Smith’s version of
constitutivism claims to be able to derive several conclusions from this notion of
functioning optimally as a desire-realiser, some of them representing substantial rea-
sons for action.
For instance, from an understanding of agents as desire-realisers, we can allegedly
deduce the fact that agents who perform their function optimally must have and
exercise the capacity to realise their desires, no matter what their content, and know
the world, no matter what the world is like. From this, Smith claims, it follows that
agents must possess coherence-inducing desires to help and not interfere, if agents are
to perform their function optimally. We are also told there is an Banalytic tie between
facts about what is desirable-relative-to-an-agent and facts about the desires of ideal
agents^, as well as between Bfacts about an agent’s reasons for action, on the one hand,
and facts about which options that agent has and what is desirable-relative-to-that-
agent, on the other .^ (Smith 2015: 193)
Smith offers a complex argument, but, for the purpose in my paper, the important
point is the link between an account of an agent as desire-realiser and the substantial
normative claims derived as constitutive of agency: how do we get from an account of
agency to substantial normative conclusions? As we have seen, there are several steps
for the derivation of the substantial normative claims made by Smith, and some are
presented explicitly as made analytically. It is not clear what Smith has in mind when
he talks about an implication’s being drawn analytically, but the following standard
account might clarify this notion sufficiently for the purpose of this paper.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic connections has a relatively long
history. My attempt here is to work with a minimal conception of this distinction, which
would be as uncontroversial as possible. According to Kant:
In all judgements in which we think the relation of a subject to the predicate (I
here consider affirmative judgements only, because the application to negative
judgements is easy afterwards), this relation is possible in two ways. Either the
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predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in
the concept A; or B, though connected with concept A, lies quite outside it. In the
first case I call the judgement analytic; in the second, synthetic. Hence
(affirmative) analytic judgements are those in which the predicate’s connection
with the subject is thought by [thinking] identity, whereas those judgements in
which this connection is thought without [thinking] identity are to be called
synthetic. (A6-7/B10)7
I am going to assume that we can regard claims in general as consisting of a subject
and a predicate – the subject indicates that to which the claim attributes the predicate.
For instance, the claim that ‘desire-realising agents who perform their function opti-
mally must have and exercise the capacity to realise their desires no matter what their
content and know the world no matter what the world is like’ can be seen as attributing
a predicate (having and exercising the capacity to realise desires no matter what their
content and knowing the world no matter what the world is like) to the subject (the
desire-realising agents who perform their function optimally).
This subject itself can be understood as a claim (‘desire-realising agents perform
their function optimally’), which attributes a predicate (performing their function
optimally) to the subject (desire-realising agents).8 One example of an analytic judge-
ment Kant offers is that all bodies are extended – we think the predicate of being
extended as contained in the concept of a body. By contrast, the claim that all bodies are
heavy does not make explicit a predicate (about the heaviness of a body) that we think
as already contained in the subject (the notion of a body); hence, the claim must
connect subject and predicate by linking them through a further element. This element
can, in some cases, be given by experience. For instance, for ‘This book is red’, the
truth of the claim depends on an experience of this book as red.
Hence, Kant claims, in the case of analytic judgements, the predicate is not different
from the subject, in the sense that it is included in the subject. This is why Kant says
that affirmative analytic judgements are those in which the predicate’s connection with
the subject is thought by thinking identity. By contrast, in the case of synthetic
judgements, the claim attributes to the subject something that does not already exist
in the notion of the subject. One implication of this is that an analytic judgement would
not be able to make a substantial claim, a claim asserting about the subject something
beyond what is already asserted by the subject. By contrast, a synthetic judgement will
assert something beyond what the subject already includes.9
An analytic claim or judgement is a claim which clarifies the concept of the subject
by making explicit at least a part of it – it does not provide anything that is not already
included in the concept of the subject (although, of course, a particular person may not
7 In what follows, when referring to Kant’s (1996) First Critique, I will do so by using the standard ‘A/B’ (first
edition/second edition, in volumes 3 and 4 of the Akademie edition Kant (1900-)) convention. The translation
used is listed in the Bibliography.
8 Again, the subject can be understood as a claim (‘the agents are desire-realising’) with a subject (agents) and
a predicate (being desire-realising).
9 BAnalytic judgements could also be called elucidatory. For they do not through the predicate add anything to
the concept of the subject; rather, they only dissect the concept breaking it up into its component concepts
which had already been thought in it (although thought confusedly). Synthetic judgements, on the other hand,
could also be called expansive. For they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been
thought in that concept at all and could not have been extracted from it by any dissection.^ (A7/B10-11)
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be aware of the predicate as part of the subject and learns something new through the
analytic judgement). By contrast, a synthetic judgement will assert something new – it
will connect the concept of the subject with another concept, which is not already
included in the subject.
One implication of this is that analytic judgements have a necessity, which is
not to be found in synthetic judgements. To deny an analytic judgement is to
deny that part of the concept of the subject (the predicate) is part of the
concept of the subject, which is contradictory and, hence, impossible. If to
deny an analytic judgement is to commit to impossibility, then the analytic
judgement is necessary and, hence, Kant says, a priori. By contrast, synthetic
judgements do not assert a predicate already included in the subject, so denying
that the predicate applies to the subject does not commit us to an impossibility.
Given the contingency of experience, analytic judgements cannot be based on
experience, whereas synthetic judgements can:
Thus the [analytic] proposition that bodies are extended is one that holds a priori and
is not an experiential judgement. For before I turn to experience, I already have in
the concept [of body] all the conditions required for my judgement. I have only to
extract from it, in accordance with the principle of contradiction, the predicate [of
extension]; in doing so, I can at the same time become conscious of the judgement’s
necessity, of which experience would not even inform me. (B11-12)
One of the crucial aspects of Kant’s distinction is that, although he thinks all
experiential judgements are synthetic, he does not think all synthetic judgements need
to be experiential, that is, based on experience or a posteriori. The idea of a synthetic a
priori judgement is what gives Kant hope that substantial judgements can be necessary
and, hence, that cognition is possible. Insofar as we take cognition to refer to those
claims, which are substantial and necessary, they can only be so if they are synthetic
and a priori. Kant thinks the propositions of mathematics are synthetic and a priori. For
Kant, a claim such as ‘7 + 5 = 12’, for instance, is synthetic, although it is also a priori.10
Kant’s account of the distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions has been
criticized in various ways. For the purpose of this paper, I cannot review the debates and
defend any particular aspect. What I hope to do is to focus on a sufficiently unproblematic
version of the distinction, while assuming that the distinction can still be used.11 The first
element of this simplified account is an assumption that declarative and imperatival
propositions (whether affirmative or negative) can be understood as having two parts: a
subject and a predicate. Secondly, there is a claim that, in the case of the analytic
10 BIt is true that one might at first think that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytic one that follows, by
the principle of contradiction, from the concept of a sum of seven and five. Yet if we look more closely, we
find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the union of the two numbers into one;
but [in thinking] that union we are not thinking in any way at all what that single number is that unites the two.
In thinking merely that union of seven and five, I have by no means already thought the concept of twelve; and
no matter how long I dissect the concept of such a possible sign, still I shall never find in it that twelve. We
must go beyond these concepts and avail ourselves of the intuition corresponding to one of the two: e.g., our
five fingers, or (as Segner does in his Arithmetic) five dots. In this way we must gradually add, to the concept
of seven, the units of five given in intuition^. (B15) It should be noted that debates continue over synthetic or
analytic nature of mathematical propositions.
11 See Robert Hanna’s BThe Return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction^ (2012; reprinted in 2015).
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propositions, the link between subject and predicate is of identity. 12 If the distinction
between analytic and synthetic propositions is to be exhaustive, then synthetic propositions
would be those where the relation between subject and predicate is not one of identity.
One implication of this basic account of the distinction is already familiar: analytic
propositions are not substantial claims: by linking subject and predicate, they do not
assert anything more than what is already presupposed by the subject of the proposi-
tions. A second, already mentioned implication is that analytic propositions are neces-
sary: their negation is a negation of a relation of identity and leads to a contradiction. As
we know from standard modal logic, it is the negation of necessity that leads to
impossibility, so analytic propositions are necessary, given that their negations lead to
contradictions. Finally, given their necessity, analytic propositions are a priori, since a
posteriori, experiential propositions are contingent and, hence, cannot be necessary.
With this background in place, the worry of an anti-constitutivist, like Wiland, can be
expressed more specifically in the following way. The issue is one of performing magic,
because, if the premises from which the constitutivist starts already include the substantial
account of normative reasons for action that the constitutivist claims to be able to derive
(for instance, the desires to help and not interfere mentioned by Smith), then these premises
are not really abstract, although as we have seen in the definition of constitutivism, they
should be so. If those premises do not already include this substantial account, then a
substantial account cannot be derived from them analytically. If it is not derived from them
analytically, then it should be derived synthetically and, yet, if it is to be derived synthet-
ically, then the validity of the derivation will be either contingent (for instance, when based
on experience) or necessary (in which case it becomes a synthetic a priori derivation).
What is specific for a substantial normative account, however, is its necessity: the claim
that something should be the case (whether ethically, aesthetically or from some norma-
tive perspective) is stronger than the claim that that thing is the case and implies a specific
requirement. Yet, in Smith’s account, it is unclear how such a derivation is to be obtained
and no indication that one of the premises in the argument would be synthetic a priori.
Smith does not examine the nature of the constitutivist argument, which is supposed
to take us from some abstract premises about agency to some substantial normative
conclusions, although he does present the argument in detail; nor does Korsgaard
examine the nature of the constitutivist argument, although she does indicate a prom-
ising avenue, which I will investigate in the next three sections. This is the promise of a
transcendental argument, which would take us from abstract premises to substantial
normative claims. Transcendental arguments have been discussed in the literature and
they are still a topic at issue. There is yet no overall agreement with regard to their role,
their structure and how they are supposed to function. They are, therefore, perhaps most
appropriate for the task of performing the magic expected from constitutivism.
12 This, as we have seen, is the way Kant presents the relation between subject and predicate for analytic
propositions. The advantage is that there is no longer any need to specify how the predicate is supposed to be
part of the subject (thought in the subject by the utterer, presupposed by the dictionary definition, implicit in
the relevant linguistic community, etc.). The disadvantage is that this way of presenting analytic propositions is
not entirely accurate. The predicate is not really identical with the subject, although, if identical, the
proposition would still be analytic; but I understand this relation of identity as follows: it is impossible for
the predicate to be denied of the subject (in the case of affirmative propositions). I will present this as an
implication of identity, but in the context of my argument it is more basic in the understanding of the relation
of identity for analytic propositions. Again, I allow this circular move here in order to avoid some of the
debates concerning the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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4 Korsgaard’s BTranscendental^ Argument
Consider the following discussion of a transcendental argument offered by Christine
Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity (1996). First, according to her, we can assume
that the human mind is Bessentially self-reflective^ (92). This means that we have a
capacity to turn our attention to our own mental activities, Bto distance ourselves from
them and to call them into question^.13 (93) This threefold process of self-reflection,
distancing and questioning enables us to have control over our actions: we can act only
by motivational factors, which we decide to endorse or which we decide not to oppose.
We can in this way control our incentives and, generally, any other factors that may
prompt us to act. In order for such mental activities to be motivational, that is, in order
for them to motivate us, we need to endorse them (or at least indirectly to endorse them
by allowing them) to be determining grounds of our actions.
For instance, I may have a powerful desire to play computer games at the moment;
upon reflection, distancing and questioning, I realise that, given an already made com-
mitment to finishing this article by a certain deadline, I should continue to work. Hence, a
mental activity, like my desire to play, will motivate me to act (and leave my work), if I
endorse it or at least if I do not oppose it. The process whereby I decide whether to allow
this desire to be a ground for my leaving my work for play may involve reflection on that
desire, as well as reflection on other reasons I might have for or against it.14
Secondly, let us suppose I act; this happens if the questioning reflective process ends
with an answer. I may conclude the questioning process with the outcome that I should
act on one of the motivational mental activities (that particular desire or some other
inclinations or predispositions). Given that I could also have acted on other motiva-
tional mental activities, the fact that I acted in this way and not in some other way
indicates that I had a reason to endorse this motivation (even when this reason was that
of illustrating an action which is performed in a particular way for no specific reason).
Hence, the conclusion of the reflective process is meant to providemewith a normative
result: the obligation, permission or prohibition, which I have reason to endorse or to
allow, is right.15 For instance, I now have a reason to continue to work, rather than play
computer games, because I have a previous commitment to completing my work by a
particular deadline and leavingmywork to play wouldmake the completion of the project
by the specific deadline less likely. My reason provides a justification, which usually
makes reference to a principle or value (carrying out what one committed oneself to do is
good) and indicates what seems to me to be what I should do. ‘Reason’, therefore, is a
Bnormative word B, which Brefers to a kind of reflective success^. (93) The same,
Korsgaard says, goes for the words Bgood^ and Bbad^. (94)
Now, if reasons are the result of reflective success, the next question is how I can lead
the reflective process to a successful conclusion. Given that the process of reflective
13 B…this sets us a problem that no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to
turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and call
them into question^. (93)
14 I do not think this process needs to be self-reflective, in the sense of being explicitly self-conscious; in other
words, it need not involve my awareness that it is me who is thinking about my desires and similar mental
activities; but it can be self-reflective simply in the sense that I reflect on my mental activities.
15 The sense in which they are right may be a precise one for the agent, but I need not specify at this stage a
particular sense – say, a moral sense or an all-things-considered sense.
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questioning is one, through which I choose which motivational element to act on, the
answer, according to Korsgaard, is that Bthe principle or law bywhich you determine your
actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself^. (100) For instance, in
deciding that I should complete what I committed myself to completing, I assume that the
principle of keeping promises is valuable for me. This, in its turn, means that the principle
functions as my principle of action, and, in this sense, it is expressive of me.
That this principle is expressive of me is another way of saying that I take it to be
justified, that it is right to act in this way given the kind of person I am and the situation
where I find myself. As an implication, we can say that I act based on an evaluative
identity or, in other words, based on a view of myself which I value. It is under such a
view that, according to Korsgaard, I find my life Bto be worth living^ and my actions,
Bworth undertaking^. (101)
One extreme illustration of this account that Korsgaard offers is a reaction against a
Bthreat of a loss of identity .^ (102) A loss of identity seems to be behind claims such as: BI
cannot do this^, when an action that seems morally abhorrent is suggested to a moral
agent. For the agent feels that acting in that way would mean abandoning some funda-
mental principle, a principle without which she would not be the same person and without
which perhaps her life would not be worth living. Hence, a person may be capable of
sacrificing herself, when the alternative would be conceived as incompatible with the kind
of person she is.16 We should bear in mind, however, that, in many cases, our reasons for
action derive from contingent and local identities. We belong to various groups and clubs,
and our memberships change periodically, sometimes without any thoroughly considered
reasons and sometimes even when, as in the extreme case presented above, they seemed
to be aspects of our identities without which we could not exist.17
Thirdly, and as a result, one way to understand scepticism, Korsgaard says, is as Bthe
fear that we might not find what Kant called ‘the unconditioned’.^ (94) Hence, one
problem is to account for normative claims, which are not conditional on local and
contingent identities. To account for such a claim, we can start with some contingent
16 As an illustration, consider the example of ethnologist and philosopher of culture Mircea Vulcanescu. He
had been incarcerated for political reasons by the Romanian Communist regime in September 1946 in the
Aiud Penitentiary. The conditions in prison were appalling and, with Vulcanescu, there were also other ill
inmates (he himself had contracted tuberculosis, but was not allowed any treatment in spite of recommenda-
tions from the penitentiary’s doctors); one of the inmates was so ill, he could not stand, and had to lie down on
very cold concrete floor. To help him, Vulcanescu set himself on the floor, so that his ill cell colleague would
lie on his body, rather than directly on the floor. Not doing anything when someone was in need was perhaps
incompatible with Vulcanescu’s personality to the point of self-sacrifice.
17 Two issues can be considered here and it might be worth distinguishing them explicitly. There is first the
issue of the unconditionality of a normative requirement. Let us say that I enjoy drinking coffee and that I now
feel a desire to drink coffee, which is based on the expectation of enjoyment. Given that I value drinking
coffee, there is a normative requirement for me to bring about a situation where I drink coffee. One question
here is whether all normative requirements are of this type, namely, contingent on some subjective factor, such
as the preference for coffee, which is presumably based on the particular way I am made up physiologically, as
well as on my particular circumstances. Let us now assume that there is at least an unconditional requirement,
a requirement that is not conditional on subjective factors. For instance, Korsgaard thinks that there is an
unconditional requirement that we are committed to some value. The second question is whether all normative
requirements (conditional or unconditional) are requirements or duties to myself or whether there are also
requirements and duties to others, where this question is not simply a question of whether I can conceive of
such duties and requirements to others, but whether there are such justified standards. The question I discuss in
relation to Korsgaard is the former, not the latter. When the sceptic doubts normativity, she doubts that there is
anything that can obligate her unconditionally.
Philosophia
identities: we are born in a certain family or community, and sometimes into a
profession or craft, we form ties to other persons, movements and ideas, and, as
contingent, many of these identities can be shed. (120) Yet, if all these identities can
be shed and no identity has an unconditional character, then the sceptic may question
whether there is anything more than contingent standards in morality.
In answer to this, Korsgaard suggests that what is not contingent is that an agent must
be governed by some conception of practical identity, by some project. Without an
identity, even a local and contingent one, there is no reason to do one thing, rather than
another one and, hence, no reason to act at all. Yet, the commitment, or rather meta-
commitment, to having some practical identity is not derived from one of the contingent
identities: Bit is a reason that springs from your humanity itself, from your identity simply
as a human beings, a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live^. (121)
On Korsgaard’s account, therefore, in order to answer the sceptical worry we need to
account for an unconditional requirement (whether an obligation, permission or prohi-
bition18). Because such a requirement stems from reasons, which are provided by
practical identities, the unconditional obligation will have to stem from a practical
identity, which is necessary. We have seen that, as self-reflective beings, having some
practical identity is necessary, if we are to be able to act. Hence, as agents, we are
committed to the non-contingent requirement of having some practical identity. This
non-contingent requirement is part of our identity as human beings; hence, it is part of
our humanity. Identities which provide reasons (whether conditional or not) are eval-
uative, and, in order for them to be evaluative, we need to be committed to their
validity. Given that the non-contingent requirement, to the validity of which we must be
committed, is part of our humanity, it follows that we must be committed to our
humanity or, in other words, Bhumanity […] must be valued^. Given that this is a
non-contingent identity, it Bmust be valued for its own sake^. (122)19
This, according to Korsgaard, can answer the sceptic: if the sceptic is a human being and
if he agrees with her argument, then the sceptic must value his humanity, if he is to act at all:
Since you are human, you must take something to be normative, that is, some
conception of practical identity must be normative for you. If you had no
normative conception of your identity, you could have no reasons for action,
and because your consciousness is reflective, you could then not act at all. […]
The argument I have just given is a transcendental argument. (123)
Korsgaard’s transcendental argument can therefore be summarised as follows: the
sceptic doubts the possibility of an unconditional requirement – he doubts (what we can
18 Of course, an obligation requires that a particular action be performed, a prohibition requires that we refrain
from performing a specific action, whereas a permission asserts that there is no obligation either to perform or
to refrain from performing a particular action. What is common to these three claims is that the claims to the
performance of the actions, to the refraining from the performance and to the possibility of performing or not
performing are unconditional. In other words, the claims are not dependent on a further subjective condition
for their validity.
19 Again, as mentioned before (see n17), this ‘must’ refers to an unconditional requirement, which is derived
from non-subjective grounds. To act, a person must be committed to some standard (a norm or value reflected
by her identity or project) and, as we have seen (in Section 2) this necessary commitment to some standard is
what Korsgaard considers to be our identity as human beings. When the fact that a person is so committed to
her humanity is also valued by that person, Korsgaard says the person has moral identity.
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call) practical normativity; yet, human beings are reflective beings, who need reasons to
act20; reasons to act are provided by evaluative identities (identities we value) and, as
evaluative identities, these identities are particular instantiations of the unconditional
requirement that, as human beings, we be committed to some identity. Yet, as a human
being, the sceptic must himself act and, in order to do so, must rely on some
unconditional evaluation – her identity as a human being; but this contradicts the
sceptic’s initial doubt, which must therefore be rejected.
If this is a transcendental argument, as Korsgaard claims it would be, then how
exactly is it supposed to work?
5 A Reconstruction of Korsgaard’s Argument
Consider a standard account of explorative or deductive transcendental arguments:
1. X.
2. Y is a necessary condition for the possibility of X.
3. Therefore Y.21
What are X and Y in Korsgaard’s argument? She relies on the fact that human beings
act and that a necessary condition, which makes possible actions for human beings, is
that they be committed to some evaluative identity. Yet, this commitment to some
evaluative identity is unconditional. Hence, if the sceptic is an agent (if she acts), then
she cannot deny practical normativity, that is, she cannot deny the unconditional
requirement provided by such an evaluative identity.22
Korsgaard’s argument can therefore be understood as a deductive transcendental
argument in the following way (call this CA1 or the Constitutivist Argument1):
23
P1. Human beings act.
P2. A necessary condition for the possibility of a human being’s action is a
commitment to an unconditional principle or value (a standard).
C. Human beings are committed to an unconditional standard.
20 Arruda in the present special issue examines reflectivity as an aspect of agency in Korsgaard’s
constitutivism.
21 For instance, in Illies (2003) or Stern (2015).
22 Recall that Korsgaard would like to show that the sceptic should acknowledge a commitment to the
unconditional standard of having some evaluative identity or, in other words, he should acknowledge his
moral identity; she thinks she can show this through a transcendental argument, which would show that his
moral identity is constitutive of agency. This commitment is not a demand, which we actually are subject to in
virtue of our moral identity; it is a commitment she thinks we have good reason to hold. By contrast, the
commitment to having some identity is a commitment, which we have insofar as we are human beings, yet, it
does not specify any particular demand, which we should actually be subject to; instead, it questions any such
demand through the need for reasons for action. This is in short the answer to Smith’s objection discussed in
Section 2.
23 This deductive transcendental argument can easily be put in the form of a retorsive transcendental argument
as follows:
1. The sceptical agent (a sceptical human being who acts) doubts practical normativity.
2. A necessary condition for the possibility of agency is a commitment to a norm.
3. Hence, agential doubt of normativity implies normativity.
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This interpretation seems to be confirmed by Korsgaard’s reformulation of the
transcendental argument:
I might bring that out more clearly by putting it this way: rational action exists, so
we know it is possible. How is it possible? And then by the course of reflections
in which we have just engaged, I show you that rational action is possible if and
only if human beings find their own humanity to be valuable. But rational action
is possible, and we are the human beings in question. Therefore we find ourselves
to be valuable. (Korsgaard 1996: 123–4)24
So Korsgaard does start from our actions as human beings, then identifies the
necessary condition which makes action possible and then asserts this necessary condi-
tion. Since this necessary condition is that of being committed to an unconditional
standard of action, and since this unconditional standard is part of our evaluative identity
as human beings, it follows that we are committed to our humanity. The sceptic, insofar
as she is an agent (that is, insofar as she acts), cannot doubt that she is committed to an
unconditional standard and, hence, cannot doubt that there is normativity.
Now, consider the first premise in CA1: Human beings act. This is a factual statement
and usually the truth of factual statements is contingent. Necessary conditions depend on
the truths for which they are conditions, so the necessary condition of acting will depend
on the contingent truth of acting. This also implies that the (necessary) condition, which
makes possible the contingent truth, will be a contingent truth, affected by the contingency
of that for which it is a condition. Specifically, the commitment to the unconditional
standard of humanity will be made manifest when we act, and if acting is contingent,
being committed to the unconditional standard of humanity will also be contingent. This
leaves it open for the sceptic to say that, although acting in the way in which Korsgaard
understands it may presuppose a commitment to an unconditional standard, there seems to
be no compelling reason to perform actions in that way.
The contingent character of the standards associated with my actions is one of the
important issues in the literature on Pyrrhonian scepticism. For, according to the Pyrrhonian
sceptic, it is possible to act without being committed to a particular belief, let alone to an
unconditional standard: BHolding to the appearances, thus, we live without beliefs but in
accord with the ordinary regimen of life, since we cannot be wholly inactive^. (Sextus
Empiricus 1996: 92) Moreover, the model of agency that this form of scepticism advances
is significantly different from that suggested by Korsgaard; the Pyrrhonian sceptic does not
seem to be prompted by some evaluative identity, but by a form of assent that, while
considering appearances, neither asserts nor denies them: B…for the sceptic does give
24 Korsgaard talks here about rational action, whereas so far we have talked about mere action; this is because
Korsgaard has pursued her argument in terms of mere action too: BTo act from such a conception [of the right
and the good] is to have a practical conception of your identity. […] [F]or if you do not allow yourself to be
governed by any conception of your identity, then you have no reason to act […] Does it really matter whether
we act as our humanity requires, whether we find some ways of identifying ourselves and stand by them? […]
If you had no normative conception of your identity, you could have no reason for action, and because your
consciousness is reflective, you could then not act at all. Since you cannot act without reasons […] you must
value your own humanity, if you are to act at all^. (122–3). As we will see later in this paper, however, there
may be a good reason for her introduction of the qualifying Brational^.
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assent to the pathé that are forced upon him by a phantasia; for example, when feeling hot
(or cold) he would not say ‘I seem not to be hot (or cold)’B. (Sextus Empiricus 1985: 90)
The extent to which this alternative conception of action is viable is a topic at issue,
and it would take me too far away from the topic of this paper to try to explore it here in
any depth.25 The important point to be drawn from this very sketchy discussion of
scepticism is that, as long as the claim of a commitment to an unconditional standard is
premised on a contingent truth, the sceptic has the legitimate option to doubt
normativity (where ‘legitimate’ simply means non-self-undermining), since by regard-
ing action as contingent he can also regard any commitment to an unconditional
standard as contingent too.26
But let us assume that action in the first premise of CA1 is not contingent: Human
beings act, but necessarily – for instance, agency is a necessary condition of humanity,
so that, human beings can only act.27 As Korsgaard puts it in a more recent text, in a
formulation with a distinctively existential flavour: BHuman beings are condemned to
choice and action^. (2009: 1 – emphasis in the original)28 If we understand the first
premise of CA1 in this way, namely, if we take it to involve a claim to necessity, then
the transcendental argument with which we started becomes:
P1’. Human beings necessarily act.
P2. A necessary condition for the possibility of a human being’s action is a
commitment to an unconditional principle or value (a standard).
C’. Human beings are necessarily committed to an unconditional standard.
Let us call this CA2. Compared to CA1, CA2 only introduces a claim of necessity in
premise P1’, a claim which, given that CA2 is valid, is preserved in the conclusion C’.
One worry about this argument is that the first premise specifies action as a necessary
feature of humanity; this is worrying since action may be right, wrong or morally
indifferent. Assuming we understand ‘human being’ in a classificatory, rather than
evaluative, sense, we will say that a human being can perform any of these three types
of action. In this case, CA2 claims that, in order to perform an action (whether right, wrong
or morally indifferent), a human being must be committed to an unconditional standard. It
follows as a result, however, that this standard will not have a specific content – it is a
necessary condition of action, irrespective of whether the action is right, wrong or morally
indifferent. Yet, then, even if the argument is correct, it cannot challenge the sceptic’s
25 For some illustrations with very suggestive titles, see Burnyeat (1998) and Greco (2012).
26 So, there are two sceptical theses: one, according to which the starting point is contingent; the second,
according to which the derivation from the starting point to the conclusion is contingent. I can only consider
the first one in this paper; the second continues to be debated in the literature and I do not need to solve it here
for the argument in this paper.
27 When I talk about ‘humanity’, in this context, I have in mind that in virtue of which we are human beings –
in this case, acting. Thus, insofar as he is a human being, that is, insofar as he has humanity, a person
necessarily acts.
28 I do not mean to suggest that the only alternative, or even that the suggestion, in Korsgaard, would be that
action is analytically presupposed by ‘human being’; it is equally possible that some other notion is
analytically contained by ‘human being’ and this notion is part of a synthetic a priori principle, in virtue of
which human beings necessarily act. A similar claim seems suggested by Korsagaard’s earlier The Sources of
Normativity (1996).
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claim about normativity.29 Moreover, if the aim is not simply that of proving the sceptic
wrong, but also that of providing guidance for moral action, then this type of argument has
no chances to succeed, since what it tries to establish are necessary conditions of action,
including wrong actions, rather than action-guiding standards.
This suggests the following solution: if the first premise is understood as a statement
specifically about right actions, then there is a chance for an argument for normativity and
for specific guidance. I have mentioned above that in some formulations of her transcen-
dental argument, Korsgaard refers not only to action, but to rational action. This, I think, is
precisely what can motivate this change from a talk about actions to a talk about rational
actions: if we take seriously Kant’s claim that an action performed under the guidance of
pure practical reason or the will is a moral action, then to talk about rational action is to
talk about moral action too.30 In this case, the transcendental argument becomes:
P1^. Human beings necessarily perform rational actions.
P2’. A necessary condition for the possibility of a human being’s performing
rational actions is a commitment to an unconditional standard.
C’. Human beings are necessarily committed to an unconditional standard.
I make haste to note that, compared to P2, P2’ is unproblematic – it is just P2 restricted
in scope from reference to actions in general to an application to rational actions only. P2’
may not be interesting, since it is weaker than P2, but, in the context of the discussion of
P2, it is unproblematic as far as its content is concerned. Thus, since a necessary condition
for performing actions in general is a commitment to an unconditional standard, a
necessary condition for performing right actions will also be a commitment to that
unconditional standard. I will call this version of the argument CA3.
CA3 seems able to avoid the problems of CA1 and CA2: it asserts a commitment to an
unconditional standard as a necessity, and it refers to rational or right actions and their
necessary condition. The problem with CA3 emerges when we pay closer attention to the
response this argument offers in fact to the sceptic. For this response does not seem any
more able to answer the sceptic and to offer practical guidance than the response offered
by CA2 does. For recall that the unconditional standard that is the necessary condition for
the performance of right/rational actions is that of following some principle or value. This,
however, is not informative, since it seems any principle or value would do.
29 If we assume that, in order to act, we need to be committed to a standard, then my action (whether right or
wrong) will indicate I am committed to that standard. Yet, it is unclear whether this is a genuine commitment.
As we have seen, for Korsgaard, being committed to standard S is the result of reflective success: I find a
reason, which is sufficiently convincing about the value of S. Yet, the fact that I need to be committed to some
identity in order to act is not a standard about which I seem to have any choice and does not seem to require
any commitment. Its unconditional character is the result of the necessity of acting and this necessity of acting
is not understood in any normative sense. On this issue, see the article by Christoph Hanisch in this volume.
30 This can be read as an implication of what, according to Henry Allison, is Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis: BThis
is the claim that freedom of the will and the moral law are reciprocal concepts. Kant affirms this explicitly in
both works [theGroundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason]; correlatively, he also insists in both works
that, although the moral law (or, better, the bindingness of the moral law for all rational agents) expresses a
synthetic a priori proposition, it would be analytic if freedom of the will were presupposed.^ (1986: 394)
Given that freedom of the will is the freedom of the pure practical reason, rational action in this sense is also
free action.
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To be sure, the claim made by the unconditional standard is not that it is sufficient to
follow a wrong principle in order to perform a rational action – this would be
counterintuitive; the claim is only that the performance of a rational action presupposes
as a necessary condition the commitment to some standard – and this does not exclude
wrong principles and evil values. Hence, although the conclusion might not be
counterintuitive, it is not substantial either.
Moreover, as in the case of CA2, we might try to argue that, although CA3 does not
conclude with our commitment to a substantial standard, nevertheless it does conclude,
against the sceptic, with our commitment to an unconditional (even if only formal)
standard. Yet, once CA3 is restricted in its first premise to rational or right actions, it can
no longer function as an answer to the initial sceptical challenge concerning unconditional
normativity. For the argument seems to presuppose that there is something called right
action that human beings necessarily perform, whereas the sceptic doubts unconditional
normativity in general. This seems to suggest a serious problem for any attempt to construct
such a transcendental argument: if the aim is to show that there is normativity, then the
sceptic cannot accept that we necessarily perform right actions, so the starting point must be
a necessity of acting in a more general sense, not restricted to the normative domain. In this
case, however, if the transcendental argument is supposed to show that the sceptic herself
must be committed to an unconditional standard, then this implies that we must accept the
possibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. I take this to be problematic.31
Be that as it may, I would like to argue that constitutivist arguments may still be able
to provide results, which are action-guiding, if the necessary condition for the perfor-
mance of rational actions is formulated as a more substantial moral standard. In fact,
this is what Korsgaard eventually plans to show, namely, that we should follow the
Categorical Imperative32, as a necessary condition for the performance of (rational)
actions. (98–100)33 Let us assume this new move succeeds and she can show that a
31 It might seem that there is no is-ought fallacy committed at this point: it might simply be a matter of
deriving a robust ‘ought’ from rational/normative features of actions. A clarificatory note is therefore apposite:
the objection is correct for the usual sense of the is-ought fallacy, but I take the fallacy in a more general sense;
consider some rational/normative features of actions – f1, f2,… fn; if they belong to actions which are rational,
then, when I attribute them to a rational action, I describe what a rational action is; the issue of going from f1,
f2,…fn to a robust ought is the same as that of going from the way a rational action is to the way it ought to be,
were it to be moral.
32 According to Kant, for limited rational agents like us, the moral law appears in imperatival form, as a
command. Hence, for us, the moral law is a Categorical Imperative. I use capital letters for this expression to
distinguish it from the maxims, which pass the test of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, maxims that Kant
sometimes calls categorical imperatives too. Korsgaard draws this distinction differently, calling the Bmoral
law^ what Kant usually calls the Categorical Imperative and, the Bcategorical imperative^ what Kant usually
takes to be a maxim: BAny law is universal, but the argument I just gave doesn’t settle the question of the
domain over which the law of the free will must range. And there are various possibilities here. If the law is the
law of acting on the desire of the moment, then the agent will treat each desire as a reason, and her conduct will
be that of a wanton. If the law ranges over the agent’s whole life, then the agent will be some sort of egoist^.
(99)
33 In her later Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity (2009), Korsgaard no longer uses explicitly the
idea of a transcendental argument, but can still be interpreted as formulating one (see, for instance, Guyer
2013). Her strategy, this time, is to introduce an additional argumentative step concerning self-constitution.
Being committed to the Categorical Imperative is not simply a necessary condition for the possibility of good
agency, but a necessary condition for the possibility of good self-constitution: Ba commitment to the moral law
is built right into the activity that, by virtue of being human, we are necessarily engaged in: the activity of
making something of ourselves.^ (2009: xiii)
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commitment to the Categorical Imperative is the necessary condition which makes
possible rational actions. The constitutivist argument, which is the focus of this paper,
becomes:
P1^. Human beings necessarily perform rational actions.
P2^. A necessary condition for the possibility of a human being’s performing
rational actions is a commitment to the Categorical Imperative.
C^. Human beings are necessarily committed to the Categorical Imperative.
Let us call this CA4; this seems to be the best version of the transcendental argument
offered by Korsgaard, or at least a version which is better than CA1–3. There is of course
a longstanding debate on the extent to which the Categorical Imperative is in any sense a
substantial or informative standard. As I have mentioned, there is also a question
concerning the extent to which Korsgaard can successfully show that the Categorical
Imperative is indeed a necessary condition for the possibility of morally right actions. I
am going to set aside these important issues, in order to focus on the main topic of this
paper: assuming the Categorical Imperative is action-guiding and assuming the sceptic
does not doubt normativity per se, but the ability we have to formulate specific standards
which have justification, does the constitutivist argument offer an answer to the sceptic?
6 An Evaluation of Korsgaard’s Argument
First, I am going to assume that P2^ is correct
34, in order to focus on P1^. I am focusing
on this premise, since it seems to make a very strong claim. It is unclear in what sense
we can say that we necessarily perform rational actions. Any case of weakness of will
or evil action shows the contrary. We could understand the claim as more limited – say,
human beings necessarily perform some rational actions. But this interpretation would
defeat the argument’s purpose: we are interested in refuting the sceptic and getting
practical guidance; if the conclusion of the argument will be that human beings are
necessarily committed to the Categorical Imperative in some instances, then this would
no longer be a commitment to an unconditional standard. If the validity of a standard
were limited to certain instances, then the standard would no longer be unconditional.
To be sure, there are instances where we may not be under the obligation of acting
under the Categorical Imperative – say, when we are asleep.35 But this is because when
we are asleep we are not treated as responsible agents. This may suggest a better
interpretation of P1^: Human beings necessarily perform rational actions, insofar as
they are human beings. Although this may account for situations where we may be
justified in not treating one person as a responsible agent, it is still not enough to make
the premise plausible. This is because even in cases where we can legitimately treat a
person as morally responsible, it may still be possible for that person to act irrationally or
34 Any moral theorist who is not a Kantian and who thinks that to act morally is to act rationally will challenge
CA2^.
35 This is an example inspired by Peter Steinberger’s BThe Standard View of the Categorical Imperative^
(1999: 95)
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against reason. Only if we take’human being’ to mean not simply a responsible being,
but a responsible rational or morally good human being, can P1^ be more palatable.
Yet, on this interpretation of P1^, where ‘human being’ is taken in an evaluative
sense, the claim is almost tautological: namely, the claim is that human beings, in the
sense of responsible and rational, good beings, necessarily perform rational actions. It is
unclear to me how, on this reading, the argument will help in any way with a response to
the sceptic’s challenge concerning unconditional normativity, since this seems to be
already assumed. Nevertheless, the argument might provide a response to the question
of moral guidance – it might be that the conclusion could provide an unconditional
standard to which human beings, in the evaluative sense of the expression, must be
committed. For recall that the two issues considered here in relation to the skeptical
challenge is the commitment to an unconditional standard and the possibility of
specifying the standard or standards to which we should be so committed – so while
the argument cannot respond to the former issue, it might still be able to respond to the
latter.
Let us now move on to P2^: A necessary condition for the possibility of a human
being’s performing rational actions is a commitment to the Categorical Imperative. As
already said, I am going to assume this is correct; what I am interested in at this stage is the
way in which it is correct. In particular, I am interested in the nature of the necessity
involved in this claim. What does it mean to say that the commitment to the Categorical
Imperative is a necessary condition which makes possible a human being’s performing
rational actions? Let us return to the analytic/synthetic distinction. P2^ is a judgement
expressing a necessity and, as we have seen, necessities can be formulated in two ways36:
either in the form of an analytic judgement or in the form of a synthetic a priori judgment.
Most recent Kantian philosophers have tried to provide accounts of some of Kant’s
insights, but without the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. A synthetic a priori
judgement, on a standard interpretation, needs the Kantian metaphysics; insofar as such
a judgement is synthetic, it can only be made a priori if the two parts of the judgement
which are connected synthetically are connected either through an a priori intuition or
through the idea of freedom. For instance, according to Kant, ‘7 + 5 = 12’ is synthetic a
priori because it is a substantial claim. As we have seen37, we cannot derive the notion
of twelve from the notion of the addition of the numbers 7 and 5. We get to this result
by constructing through our a priori intuitions (either through a spatial or through a
temporal representation, but in the case of this example, through a temporal represen-
tation of the numbers and their sum) the mathematical operation and its result.
Whether we regard an a priori intuition or an idea of reason as able to connect
synthetically and a priori the parts of the judgement, we would need to accept at least
parts of Kant’s metaphysics. This is because space and time (as a priori intuitions) and
freedom (as an idea of reason) could unify parts of a judgement only if we regarded
them as structural elements of the mind, and this, I would argue, presupposes at least
some important parts of transcendental idealism.38
36 There seems to be no reason to think that there would be a third possibility for accounting for necessity that
would be introduced by Korsgaard; she does draw a distinction in her Self-Constitution between three forms of
necessity, but there is no explicit account of how we are to understand the notion of necessity she favours. See
Korsgaard (2009: 1–2).
37 See n10 above.
38 See also Baiasu (2011).
Philosophia
If so, then one alternative is to regard P2^ as analytic and to understand the necessity
of the commitment to the Categorical Imperative as the result of the fact that this
commitment is already presupposed by the notion of performing rational or moral
actions. In the same way in which a necessary condition for the possibility of being a
bachelor is to be unmarried, a necessary condition for the possibility of performing
rational actions is to be committed to the Categorical Imperative. To make this more
palatable, we can rephrase the condition so that it is not expressed directly as a
Categorical Imperative, but as, say, a principle of universalisability or of not treating
others merely as ends for our purposes.
But this has problematic implications for CA4. Thus, if part of being human (in the
evaluative sense) is to perform rational actions and if performing rational actions means
being committed to the Categorical Imperative, then CA4 only makes explicit some-
thing that was already implicit in the evaluative sense of the notion of a human being.
One possibility is for the sceptic to agree with this notion of a human being, but, then,
she does not need an argument to accept a commitment to an unconditional standard.
The other possibility is when she does not agree with the evaluative notion of human
being, in which case CA4 cannot help, since all CA4 does is to make explicit something
already included in the evaluative notion of human being.
The only alternative left, then, is that P2^would represent a claim to necessity provided
by a synthetic a priori judgement. For instance, rational agency and the Categorical
Imperative could be connected through freedom. Since the Categorical Imperative is a
law of freedom and action presupposes freedom, we can perhaps assert P2^ as a synthetic
a priori judgement. As a synthetic judgement, P2^ would assert something about the
rational actions of good human beings, which would not already be included in these
notions. If the necessary condition of rational action is a commitment to an unconditional
standard, and if this commitment is not simply a commitment to something already
presupposed by the notion of a morally good human being, then the argument can refute
the sceptic and provide an action-guiding moral criterion. This would then be the path
that would need to be followed by a constitutivist in order to offer a substantial account of
normative reasons or standards of action and at the same time to refute scepticism about
such an account by starting from premises that are sufficiently weak to be acceptable also
to the sceptic.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that constitutivism can represent a genuine avenue for
constructivist attempts to formulate normative standards without realist metaphysical
presuppositions and in a non-arbitrary, principled way. I have focused specifically on
Korsgaard’s constitutivism and on an epistemic aspect of the debate concerning
constitutivism. More precisely, I discussed whether it is possible to construct substantial
normative standards through an argument with premises, which are less substantial
normatively. In general, supporters of constitutivism argue that such a justification of
normative standards is possible and they present various arguments as illustrations of
how such a justification is to be carried out, yet they do not examine the nature of such
an argument. This leaves them open to the accusations that what they are trying to
achieve is only possible by magic.
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Unlike other supporters of constitutivism, Korsgaard makes an important suggestion
about the nature of such an argument – she thinks a transcendental argument can
perform the magic of pulling the normative rabbit out of the constitutivist’s hat. If
successful, such an argument would enable her to answer the sceptic who doubts the
existence of unconditional practical standards. It would enable her to answer also the
related question of the possibility of deriving robust practical norms from slender
premises, which represents a version of the classical problem of empty formalism
any Kantian moral theorist needs to face.
I began with an objection to Korsgaard’s constitutivism in The Sources of
Normativity, an objection according to which, in that text, Korsgaard’s starting point
is an account of persons as essentially defined in a way which attributes them, as a
matter of fact, some demand. This is in fact a quarrel in the family, as it is a supporter of
constitutivism that formulates it. It is, therefore, not so much an objection to the
promise of constitutivism, as to the particular version formulated by Korsgaard.
However, we have seen that this criticism is unwarranted and very likely generated
by Korsgaard’s talk of reasons as deriving from specific identities and roles we are
committed to in our everyday life. The criticism is unwarranted, because, although our
identities and roles do come with particular demands, the source of our commitment to
them is grounded in a more fundamental identity we have as reflective beings, who
need reasons in order to commit to particular roles and projects, and in order to act.
Korsgaard takes as starting point this more fundamental identity, which sets us the task
of justification and reason-providing, rather than attributing to us a particular demand
as already justified and normative.
After an excursus aiming to bring more clarity to the conceptual framework, in
particular the analytic-synthetic distinction, I have presented in more detail
Korsgaard’s account of agency, I reconstructed her transcendental argument and
I have evaluated the strongest version. The evaluation of the argument has shown
that the crucial aspect of the argument is the premise, which links the starting
point (the account of agency) and the conclusion (the commitment to the norma-
tive standard). This premise needs to be synthetic and a priori, if it is to enable the
argument to function in the expected way. Yet, in order to be able to justify a
synthetic a priori judgement, we need to adopt some form of transcendental
idealism.39
Whereas such a commitment would still be compatible with the constructivist’s
intention to avoid metaphysical realism in practical philosophy and arbitrary decisions
about the normative standard to be observed, it would go in a different direction than
that intended by Korsgaard, who has been careful to avoid commitments to transcen-
dental idealism. Quite independently of this, transcendental idealism has been criticised
in various ways; one longstanding and reiterated criticism has been that it fails for offer
a distinct metaphysical position and ultimately collapses into, and becomes indistin-
guishable from, traditional idealism with all its problems. While I think the latter
criticism is unwarranted, all this shows is that a viable constitutivism comes with what
are standardly regarded as quite high costs.40
39 For a recent good discussion of some versions of transcendental idealism, see Richard Aquila (2015).
40 See also my texts Baiasu (2013, 2016).
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